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WILL THE GREAT BANANA WAR EVER END: 
WILL THE TARIFF ONLY SYSTEM BE THE 
SOLUTION? 
JESSICA L. SPIEGEL 
Abstract: The European Union and the United States are in the 
midst of the Great Banana War, a trade dispute over EU banana 
tariffs. The World Trade Organization authorized sanctions against 
the EU, effective until the EU modifies its banana tariff system to 
comply with WTO rules. Meanwhile, the EU's fonner colonies, the 
ACP nations, are caught in the precarious position of losing the EU's 
preferential treatment concerning the banana tariffs. This Note 
highlights the issues surrounding this conflict and advocates on 
behalf of the EU's latest re-configuration of its tariff system. 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) currently is involved in complex and 
conflicting obligations concerning its Banana Trade War with the 
United States (US).l The EU's convoluted system of tariffs and quotas 
on banana imports, otherwise known as the "New Banana Regime,"2 
favors banana imports from several EU nations' former colonies in 
Mrica, the Caribbean, and the Pacific ("ACP countries").3 By allowing 
preferential trade benefits to the ACP countries, the EU has effec-
tively limited the number of Latin American bananas that EU nations 
can import.4 US multinational corporations are infuriated with the 
New Banana Regime because their Latin American banana producers 
are excluded by the EU's trade preferences.5 The US claims that the 
EU's protectionist trade policy violates global trade rules under 
I Rodrigo Bustamante, The Need{or a GATrDoctJine of LOCIlS Sialldi: 1I71Y Ihe l Tnited Siaies 
Cannol Siand Ille Ell I"O/Jean CommllllilY:5 Banal/a IIII/Jorl Regime. 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 533, 
533-35 (1997). 
2Id. 
3 Id. at 538-40. 
4 Gordon Fairclough & Darren McDermott, Fruil of Labor: The Banana Business Is ROI-
len, So \\71)' Do PeO/Jle Figllt Over II?, WALL ST.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at AI. 
5 Eric Margolis, U.S. Trade liar lUi III EumjJe LaO/lis, EDMONTON SUN, Dec. 24, 1998, at 11. 
The main coq)orations inyolyed are Chiquita Brands International, Inc" Dole Foods, and 
Hawaiian Banana Industry Association. !d. 
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GATT. On March 3, 1999, the US retaliated by imposing high tariffs 
on certain EU imports.6 The EU acknowledges that it must re-
negotiate its trade preferences with the ACP nations in order to have 
the flexibility to comply with its WTO obligations.7 On November 10, 
1999, the EU proposed a completely new banana trade regime that it 
hopes will comply with WTO trade rules, satisfy some of its ACP 
commitments, and consequently force the US to cease imposing sanc-
tions.s 
The Banana War is the result of conflicting protectionist eco-
nomic policies of the EU and the US. Continuance of the trade war 
has the potential to jeopardize trade relations between the two trad-
ing blocks.9 The core issues underlying the Banana War, namely the 
EU's difficulty reconciling its ACP commitments with its WTO obliga-
tions, and the US's determination to maintain every possible eco-
nomic advantage, will resurface under another guise if they are not 
confronted and corrected as soon as possible. Io 
Part I of this Note examines the history of the Banana Trade War. 
Part II discusses the EU's frantic and precarious position of recogniz-
ing its historical obligations to its former colonies-the ACP trade 
preferences-while complying with WTO trade rules that will allow 
the EU to participate fairly in global trading.!1 Part III of this Note 
analyzes the EU's new proposal for the banana regime. I2 After many 
rejected proposed amendments to the New Banana Regime, the EU 
finally has agreed to overhaul its banana import system in hopes of 
satisfying all of its varying interests.!3 Finally, this Note concludes with 
an assertion that the tariff-only proposal is the most promising solu-
tion offered thus far by the EU because it aims to satisfy all involved 
parties. I4 Moreover, because of the EU's earnest attempt to treat eve-
ryone fairly, the US should reward the EU by lifting its sanctions. I5 
6 Declaration by Sir Leon Brittan to the European Parliament on Banana Dispute with 
the US, EU DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR TRADE, Mar. 9,1999. 
7 Hale Sheppard, The LOllle Convention in the Next MilteniulIl: Modification of the Trade/Aid 
Package and Support for Regionallntegration, 7-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 84, 91 (1998). 
8 Matthew Newmann, EU Commission to Decide on New Plan in Banana Row Wednl'sday, 
Dow JONES INT'L NEWS, No\". 8, 1999. 
9 Dagens Nyhekr, Banana Trade Unr is Bal/allaS, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 1999, at 25. 
10 The US/EU Banana Dispute: Modifications to the EC Banana Regime, DIRECTOR-
ATE GEN. FOR TRADE, No\". 10, 1998; see Margolis, supra note 5. 
11 Sheppard, supra note 7, at 91. 
12 Newmann, Slt/Ha note 8. 
13/d. 
14 Ed.; Sheppard, supra note 7, at 91. 
15 Newmann, supra note 8. 
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE BANANA WAR 
The roots of the banana controversy began in the years immedi-
ately following World War I, when the victorious nations of France, 
Britain, and Italy initiated a policy of preserving trade preferences for 
their former colonies in Mrica, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.16 In 
1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), which included six signatory states and eighteen of their 
former colonies under "associate" status.17 "Associate status" intended 
to aid the integration of these formerly dependent territories into the 
world economy by employing trade preferences because the EEC 
countries harbored a "residual sense of responsibility for the colonial 
past."18 
In 1973, the Treaty of Accession brought Britain, Ireland, and 
Denmark into the EEC.19 In addition, Britain wanted to include its 
former colonies with the other EEC "associate status" nations.20 This 
request prompted the 1975 Lome I Convention which officially 
formed an alliance between the nine European countries in the EEC 
and almost fifty ACP countries.21 The Lome I Convention included 
the following: (l) a move toward non-reciprocal duty-free and quota-
free access to EEC markets for ACP countries, (2) an export earnings 
stabilization scheme, (3) financial and technical assistance towards 
the development of the ACP nations, and (4) establishment of im-
plementing institutions for the convention.22 
Subsequently, the Lome Convention was re-negotiated in 1980, 
1985, and 1989, culminating in Lome IV, a strong economic arrange-
16 Azar M. Khansari, Searching Jor Ihl' Pnfi'cf Solulion: Intematiollal Dis/mte Resolution and 
theNe1ll Hbrl,d Trade Olgallizatioll, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. RE,·. 183, 197 nn.l50-51 
(1996) (citing Jeff Harrington, Chiqllita Becomes u.s. Tmde Tl'st Case, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, 
Jan. 22. 1995). 
17 Zsolt K. Bessko. Going Bananas (iller EEC PreferP1lces?: A Look at the Banana Trade H'rI1' 
and thl' WI'O's Undflstanding 011 Ruff'S and Procedures GOllfl'uing till' Sl'ttlnlll'nt oj Dis/JlIles. 28 
CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 265, 269 n.24 (1996) (citing Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Comlllunity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4, arts. I:H-36 and annex IV). The 
original six EEe lIlembers included France, Belgiulll, the Netherlands. Luxembourg, Italy, 
and West Germanv. !d. at 269 n.24. 
18 Sheppard, .;upm note 7, at 84. 
19 Bessko, SlI/Jm note 17, at 269 n.27 (citing Treaty Concerning the Accl'ssiol1 oj Del/mark. 
Ireland and the United Kingdom oj Blitain alld Northem Ireland to thl' Euro/Jean Economic Com-
munity and to tllf' European Atolllic Energy Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 197 OJ. SPEC. ED. 5). 
20 !d. at 270 n.30 (citing ACP-EEC COlwention of LOllle, Feb. 28. 1975, 1976 OJ. 
(L.25) 2), 1'ejJlillted in 141.L.1\·1595 (1975). 
21 Id. at 270 n.29 (citing ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Feb. 28, 1975, 1976 OJ. 
(L.25) 2), rejJlillted in 14 I.L.M 595 (1975). 
22 Id. 
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ment behveen the EU's advanced market economy and the markets of 
the less-developed ACP nations. 23 Lome IV provides that no ACP state 
that traditionally has supplied bananas to the EU will be placed in a 
less favorable position in the EU market than it presently enjoys or 
previously had enjoyed.24 The EU's preferential treatment of the ACP 
nations has stabilized and promoted the economic development of 
these countries.25 However, the system of trade preferences under 
Lome IV adversely affected Latin American countries that also rely 
heavily on banana exports for their economies but do not have equal 
access to the EU market. 26 
These Latin American bananas are called "dollar" bananas be-
cause they are grown by American multinational corporations, such as 
Dole and Chiquita, on enormous plantations in Latin America.27 
"Dollar" bananas have an economic advantage over the ACP bananas 
because their production is less costly than that of Caribbean bananas, 
largely due to cheaper transportation and labor costs.28 ACP banana 
production suffers from poor terrain, poor soil conditions, independ-
ent farmers, natural disasters, and more expensive shipping costs due 
to the absence of economies of scale.29 Thus, ACP bananas are 
roughly twice as expensive to produce as Latin American bananas. As 
a result, ACP bananas were unable to compete with Latin American 
bananas for importation into the open market of the EU.30 
On July 1, 1993, the EU introduced the New Banana Regime 
(Regulation 404/93)31 that replaced the various national import sys-
tems of the EU Member States with a single uniform system, and es-
sentially guaranteed ACP countries a certain share of the EU banana 
23 ld. at 270 n.32 (citing Second ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Oct. 31, 1979, 1980 
OJ. (L347) 2, re/nill/ed in 191.L.M. 327 (1980); Third ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Dec. 
8,1984,24 I.L.M. 571 (1985); Founh ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Dec. 15, 1989, re-
plinted in THE COURIER, No. 120, Mar.-Apr. 1990, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990)). 
24 Richard Lyons, European [filion Banana Controversey, 9 FLA.]. INT'L L. 165, 177 n.119 
(1994), (citing Founh ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Dec. 15,1989, List of Signataries, 
Treaty Series No. 47 (1992) Cm 1999 (Eng.), 29 I.L.M. 788, pt.5, Protocol 5 (entered into 
force Sept. 1, 1991)). 
25 Khansari, supra note 16, at 198. 
26 Sheppard, supra note 7, at 87. 
2; jack J. Chen, Going Bananas: How the WTO Can Heal the Split in the Global Banana 
Trade Dispute, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1283, 1298-99 (1995). 
28 Kllansari, supra note 16, at 198 n.162 (citing Bert Wilkinson, Caribbean COl/lIIlUllity 
Writes Clinton Seeking Truce in Banana Dispute, Assoc. PRESS POLITICAL SERV., 1996 WL 
5391181,jlln. 25, 1996). 
29 Sheppard, supra note 7, at 86. 
30 Chen, supra note 27, at 1299. 
31 Bustamante, sujHa note 1, at 537-38. 
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market. 32 The Regime was the EU's attempt to reconcile its regulation 
of the banana market with three of its obligations: (l) its duty to the 
EU Single Market, which formed a trading area with no internal bar-
riers to obstruct the free flow of goods among member nations, (2) its 
commitment to the ACP countries that their banana exports would be 
protected, arising in the Lome IV Convention, and (3) its obligations 
under the Uruguay Round of GATT, where a crucial objective was 
opening markets in industrialized countries to products from devel-
oping countries.33 The New Banana Regime imposed a tariff quota on 
banana imports that was applied according to whether the bananas 
originated from ACP or non-ACP countries. Under this tariff-quota 
system, ACP bananas may enter Europe duty-free until 2002 and non-
ACP bananas are subject to a tariff quota. 34 Regulation 404/93 also 
iinposed a licensing scheme requiring the distribution of banana im-
port licenses under the tariff quota among three categories of eligible 
operators.35 The new regime consisted of five separate titles establish-
ing uniform rules on common quality and marketing standards, pro-
ducers or organizations and concentration mechanisms, assistance, 
trade with third countries, and other general provisions.36 
Colombia, Costa-Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Hondu-
ras, Panama, Mexico, and EI Salvador are the Latin American coun-
tries that are adversely affected by the New Banana Regime.37 The 
United States, claiming that it also has been disadvantaged by the EU 
trading preferences, has become involved in the dispute, declaring 
that the regime violates certain provisions ofthe "VTO.38 
32/d. 
33 Lyons, supra note 24. at 167. 176. 
34 Khansari, supra note 16, at 199 nn.170-71 (citing Council Regulation 404/93 of 13 
Feb. 1993 on the Common Organization of the Market in Bananas, tit. IV, art. 18s 1, and 
tit. V, art. 132, 1993 OJ. (1.,.47/1)). 
35 Bustamante, sujJra note 1, at 540 n.42 (citing Case C-280/93. Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Council. E.C.R. 1-4973. [1994] 34 I. L. 1\1. 168 (1995)). 
36 Lyons. sujJra note 24, at 178 n.126 (citing Council Regulation 404/93, ar1.12, Titles 
I-V, 1993 OJ. (1,47)). 
37 Khansari, Sit/1m note 16. at 199 n.172 (citing Debra Perciyal. Thild World-Trade: Rise 
ill EU Ballana Quotes Benefits Latin America, INTER PRESS SERYICE, 1995 WL 2260164, Apr. 4, 
1995). 
38 Eric Margolis, sU/J1'a note 5. The \\TO replaced the GATT sYstem on January 1, 
1995, providing a comlIlon institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations 
among its membel'S concerning the agreements negotiated under the Uruguay Roull(l. 
Khansari, supra note 16, at 188. The DSU originaled oul of the shortcomings of the GATT 
dispute settlement arrangement and eliminated ineffecth'e GATT policies, such as the 
consensus voting. /d. 
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Immediately after the EU announced its New Banana Regime, 
many Latin American banana producing countries, five of which were 
GATT members, requested that a VVTO Panel examine the legality of 
the regime and find that the EU's trade preferences violated GATT's 
free trade principles.39 Principally, the countries claimed that the EU's 
import regime was inconsistent with the Most Favored Nation clause 
(MFN) in Article I, paragraph 1 of GATT.40 According to this provi-
sion, each GATT member must extend MFN status to all other mem-
bers. This requires equal access to the markets for all GATT members; 
any discrimination against any member is prohibited.41 Both the Latin 
American countries and the ACP countries are Contracting Parties 
under GATT.42 
Subsequently, the VVTO Panel condemned the EU banana import 
regime.43 It held that certain features of the EU's tariff preferences 
toward the ACP countries violated global trading laws because they 
imposed unacceptably disparate treatment on certain nations, specifi-
cally the Latin American banana producing countries, inconsistent 
with Article I of GATT.44 
The EU rejected the VVTO Panel ruling, claiming that dire politi-
cal and economic consequences would result in the ACP economies if 
the EU opened up its market to the less expensive Latin American 
bananas.45 Due to the need for "consensus" voting under GATT, the 
EU managed to block the adoption of the VVTO Panel decision. 46 In 
addition, the EU was able to avoid complying with the VVTO ruling by 
39 Khansari, supra note 16, at 199 n.175 (citing GAIT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on 
the European Economic COllllllunity-Import Regime for Bananas, 34 I.L.M. 177 (1994)). 
40 Ill. The countries named other GATT provisions that they believed the EU violated, 
such as the "National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation" provisions and 
Article II's Schedule of Concessions, both of which the \\'TO Panel found to be valid criti-
cism of the banana regime. Ill. 
41 Sheppard, supra note 7, at 87. 
42 Khansari, supra note 16, at 200. 
43 Sht'ppan\, supra note 7, at 87n.39 (citing GAIT Panel Says EC's Banana Import Regime 
Discriminated Against Latin Amelican Natiolls, INT'L TRADE REpORTER.,Jun. 2, 1993). 
44 Id. 
45 Lyons, supra note 24, at 170 n.43 (citing Alison Maitland, Commissionel'Rejects G11T 
Attack all Ell Banalla Regillle, FIN, TIMES LIMITED, Feb. 23, 1994, at 34). 
46 Sht'ppard, supra nott' 7, at 87 nn.40-41 (citing Tt'rel1('e P, Stewart, The Hvrld Trade 
Olgallization: iVIllltilateral Trade Fralll17110rk for the 21st Celltul} and US ImjJlelllellting Legislation, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1996, at 33; Latin American Nations Ask GAIT to Adopt Panel 
Report on EC Banana Dilties, INT'L TRADE REpORTER, Jul. 28, 1993), According to Article 
23 (2) of GATT, "consensus voting" means that a panel holding was not enforceable unless 
all members including the party against whom the decision was made, agreed to adopt it. 
Sheppard, supra note 7, at 87 11.40, 
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claiming a waiver from GATT non-discrimination rules.4' In pertinent 
part, the EU claimed that the Lome Conventions create a "customs 
union" pursuant to Article XXIV of GATT.48 This article provides that 
in exceptional circumstances, the contracting parties may waive an 
obligation imposed upon them, provided that such a decision is ap-
proyed by a two-thirds m~ority of the vote.49 The EU obtained that 
m~ority and waived the application of GATT rules to the Banana Pro-
tocol of Lome IV."o Therefore, this waiver sheltered the Lome Con-
vention and exempted it from the obligations of Article I of GATT 
until the expiration of Lome IV on February 28, 2000.51 
Angered by the EU's ability to avoid compliance with the wro 
ruling, the Latin American countries turned to the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) and the wro Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) for relief.52 Pursuant to Title III of the US Trade Act of 1974, 
the USTR has extensive authority to address illegal, unfair, and dis-
criminatory foreign practices that restrict US exports.53 The USTR is 
authorized to suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of trade 
concessions, impose duties or import restrictions, or enter into 
agreements to remedy the situation.54 
In this case, based on a petition of Chiquita Brands International, 
Inc., the world's largest banana producer, the USTR initiated an in-
vestigation under section 301 of the Trade Act (also known as "Super 
301") .55 "Super 301" authorizes the USTR to take appropriate action if 
the US economy is UI~ustifiably burdened or restricted under any 
trade agreement.56 It also provides the medium in the US through 
which private parties can enforce US rights under international trade 
47 Khansari, sujJra note 16, at 200-0 I. 
48 Sheppard, .sujJra note 7, at 87 n.43 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Article XXV(5)). 
49/d. 
50 Khansari, slljHa note 16, at 201. 
51/d. 
52 Id. at 87-88 n.45 (citing Guy de jonquieres, Ell Ballalla Poliry 'Prn1erse alld Inefficirnt' 
Says Horld Bank. FIN. TIMEs,jan. 20,1994). 
53 Sheppard, sl/jHa note 7, at 88 n.46 (citing El.' to De[md Ballalla Rulrs From [(I) Attarli. 
THE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REpORT, Sept. 28, 1995). 
54 Bcssko, SIIjJl'{I note 17, at 282 n.122 (citing Trade Act of 1974, S :~01 (c), 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2411(c) (1988)). 
55 Sheppard, slIjJra note 7, at 88. Chiquita already had captured approximate Iv 45% of 
Germany's market because Germany offered a fi'ee market with no import restrictions or 
tariffs. Donald L. Barlett & james B. Steele, With Big Malley and Politirs, 117w Gets Hurt? How 
to Become A Top Ballalla, TiME MAG., Feb. 7,2000 at 45. 
56Id. at 88 n.47 (citing Trade Act of 1974, Title III. Chapter 1. Section 301). 
226 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 24:219 
agreements and respond to certain unfair trade practices.57 The 
USTR determined that it should retaliate against the EU's banana 
import regime because it violated GATT and economically disadvan-
taged the US.58 
However, the EU rightfully signaled that any unilateral measure 
taken by the US would violate the wro's Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU).59 As a result, the USTR and Latin American compa-
nies filed an official complaint with the wro, declaring the New Ba-
nana Regime violative of wro trade rules.60 The complaint 
demanded two remedies: (1) a larger quota for Latin American fruit, 
and (2) changes in the EU's licensing system.6} 
In April 1997, the wro Dispute Panel ruled that the EU's New 
Banana Regime violated wro trading rules and directed the EU to 
"bling the regime in line with its obligations under global trade ac-
cords. "62 Specifically, the EU panel found the following measures in-
consistent with the wro rules: "(1) the granting of import licenses 
for Latin American bananas to British companies as opposed to 
American companies, (2) the imposition of unequally burdensome 
requirements for imports from Latin America, and (3) the discrimina-
tory allocation of access to the EU market not using past levels of 
trade as a criteria."63 Unlike earlier decisions under GATT rules that 
required a consensus vote to impose the ruling, all wro decisions are 
binding unless all members decide by consensus to reject them.64 
Therefore, the EU had no way to avoid compliance.65 
As a result, the EU Council of Ministers modified the New Ba-
nana Regime with the adoption of Regulation 1637/98, to take effect 
57 Bessko, supra note 17, at 282 n.1l8 (citing Trade Act of 1974, § 301-09, as amended, 
19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988». 
58 Sheppard, supra note 7, at 88. 
59 ld.; EU Requests WTO Panel Against US Section 301 Legislation, DIRECTORATE 
GEN. FOR TRADE, Brussels (Feb. 17, 1999), arJailable at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgO/ 
sect3011.htm. 
60 Sheppard, supra ltote 7, at 88 nA9 (citing U.S. Complains Again to tlTO, St. Lucia Ac-
cuses Chiquita ofTl:ying to Destmy Industry, LAT. AM. REGIONAL REpORTS, Caribbean, Feb.29, 
1996). 
61ld. 
62 Id. at 88 n.50 (citing Wesley Gibbings, Regional Officials Examine l'lTO Ruling, INTER 
PRESS SERV., Apr. 7, 1997); Genit Schohe, The "rJ'O Panel Report on the Ell's Banana Regime. 
Will the Rule of Law Prevail over Political Arbih-ainess?, EUR. FOOD L. REv. Frankfurt am Main. 
Vol. 8, No.3, 245-263,18 Aug. 1997. 
63 Sheppani, supra note 7, at 88 n.Sl (citing Brendan McGrath, l-lTO Ruling on Ba-
nanas May Hit Fyffes, THE IRISH TIMES, May 24, 1997). 
MId. at 88 n.52 (citing Dispute Settlement Understanding-WTO, Article 19(1». 
65 See id. 
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on January 1, 1999.66 Regulation 1637/98 either eliminated or 
amended the provisions designated by the WTO as inconsistent with 
global trade laws.67 In addition, the EU reformed its accompanying 
licensing arrangement to take effect with Regulation 1637/98.68 
Despite these efforts to comply with the WTO, the US claimed 
that the EU still was not implementing the \VTO ruling correctly.69 
Consequently, on January 14, 1999, the US requested permission 
from the WTO to impose $520 million US in sanctions against the EU 
for noncompliance.7o In response, an angry EU requested a WTO 
Panel arbitration to determine that the US sanctions were illegal un-
der \VTO rules. 71 Consequently, the WTO suspended the issue until 
the original panel decided on the compliance of the New Banana Re-
gime's reforms that took effect on January 1,1999.72 
The WTO Dispute Settlement rules indicate that the WTO first 
must examine whether the New Banana Regime complies with the 
\\'TO's earlier ruling before it authorizes the US to proceed with 
sanctions.73 Despite the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
rules, the US threatened to use "Super 30 I" sanctions anyway.74 In re-
sponse, on March 2,1999, the EU requested a separate WTO panel to 
examine the legality of the US' threats vis-a-vis international trade and 
dispute settlement rules under the \VTO DSU.75 On March 3, 1999, 
the US imposed $520 million US worth of sanctions on EU imports, 
mostly luxury items, defying the \VTO Article 23 which explicitly pro-
hibits unilateral action by a WTO member without WTO authoriza-
tion, and violating other articles banning suspension of concessions 
66 The US/EU Banana Dispute, Modifications to the EC Banana Regime, DIRECTOR-
ATE GEN. OF TRADE, Nov. 10, 1998. 
67/d. 
68/d. 
69 /d. Attached to this report is a chart olltlining the original Banana Regime, the 
WTO comment, and the revised Banana Regime that the EU bdie\'es is "''TO compatible. 
70 See James M. Coopel', Sj}ilits in the Mate/ial Hbrfd: A Post-Alodern Aj)j)l'()ach to United 
States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. RE\'. 95i, 972 (1999). 
71 EC Request for Establishment of a Panel on Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 
19i4, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR TRADE. 
72 Statement by H.F. Beseler at the European Parliament, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR 
TRADE, Feb. 3, 1999. 
73 The US/EU Banana Dispute, Modifications to the EC Banana Regime, supra note 
66. 
74 EU Requests \\'TO Panel Against US Section ,)01 Legislation, DIRECTORATE GEN-
ERAL FOR TRADE, Feb. Ii, 1999. 
75 Declaration by Sir Leon Brittan on the European Parliament on Banana Dispute 
with the US, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR TRADE, Plenary Meeting, {Illailable at http://europa. 
('u.int/comm/dgO/I003bana.htm (last modified Mar. 9,1999). 
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while arbitration is taking place.76 The WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
may grant authorization to impose sanctions only after it has con-
cluded that a Member State has failed to implement a ruling.77 
In response to the US sanctions, the EU argued that it had re-
vised its system to comply with the WTO ruling. However, if the US 
disagreed, it was a matter for the WTO to resolve via the DSU proc-
ess.78 The EU publicly announced its vehement opposition to the US' 
retaliatory sanctions and requested a WTO order to discontinue the 
illegal sanctions on March 5, 1999.79 
On April 19, 1999, the WTO decided that various elements of the 
EU's revised banana import regime were inconsistent with WTO trade 
rules.80 At the same time, the WTO informed the US that it was enti-
tled to impose, temporarily, $191.4 million US of retaliatory tariffs on 
various European productS.81 This amount was a sharp reduction 
from the original US request of $520 million in sanctions.82 Since the 
WTO's April decision, the EU has been trying frantically to come up 
with a viable solution to end the US sanctions because of the extensive 
damage they are causing many EU industries.83 
II. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES 
The EU maintains two distinct obligations as (1) a global trading 
partner under the WTO and (2) a trading block allowing preferential 
i6 fd.; EU Requests \;\'1'0 Panel Against US Section 301 Legislation, sllpra note 74. 
ii EU Requests WTO Panel Against US Section 301 Legislation, supra note 74. 
is Sheryle Bagwell, Banana Row Sets Scene for Bigger Trade Will'S, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REv. 
12, 1999WL5068468 (l'hr.ll, 1999). 
i9 The US/EU Banana Dispute, Modifications to the EC Banana Regime, sltpra note 
66; see EU FilRs ComjJlaillt ill Banalla HYlI; THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 5, 1999. 
80 EU-US Banana Dispute: Latest Developments in the Bananas Trade Dispute, DIREC-
TORATE GEN. FOR TRADE (last modified Apr. 12, 1999), I!lJailablR at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dgO/1204bana.htm; Barlett & Steele, silpra note 55, at 44. 
SI EU-US Banana Dispute: Latest Developments in the Bananas Trade Dispute. sil/mi. 
82 Id. 
S:l See The European Commission Outlines Options for a Nt'w Banana Regime. DIREC-
TORATE GEN. FOR TRADE, May 27, 1999. The US' punitive tariffs also are callsing many 
slllall American businesses to suffer because they can no longer afford to pay to import the 
targeted goods. Barlett & Steele, slt/Jra note 55. at 45. On May 18, 2000, President Clinton 
signed into law a bill that includes a provision on "carousel retaliation," which requires the 
USTR to revise every six months the list of goods targeted for retaliatory tariffs. The 
EU/US Bananas Dispute, "Carousel Retaliation," DEPT. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, Apr. 
1999, available at http:/ h\'\\w.bananalink.org.llk/trade_war/trade_war.htm (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2000). 
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treatment to certain lesser developed nations.84 One crucial differ-
ence between the two commitments is that the EU's VVTO obligations 
are non-negotiable whereas its Lome IV Convention commitments are 
negotiable.85 Abiding by certain conditions is the sacrifice each VVTO 
member must make in order to receive the benefits of joining a group 
of trading partners.86 Thus, the "VTO has made it clear that the EU 
must satisfY its VVTO obligations or it will continue to be punished in 
the form of economic sanctions by the US.87 Therefore, the EU's 
Lome IV Convention commitments must yield in light of the EU's 
predicament in order for the EU to create a banana import regime 
that satisfies the "VTO rules.88 The Lome IV's renewal in February 
2000 gave the EU an ideal opportunity to re-examine its position in 
the global economy.89 The EU re-evaluated the entire concept behind 
the Lome Conventions and decided to alter its ACP commitments in 
order to comply with global trade rules. However, the EU has not yet 
reached a satisfactory compromise with the ACP nations.90 
A. VVhy Lome IV Is Outdated and Needs to Be Replaced 
The Lome IV Convention has fallen into disfavor with many sec-
tors in the EU.91 First, the European banana trade system, specifically 
the Lome IV Convention, is largely economically inefficient and inef-
fective. 92 The estimated cost of the arrangement is approximately $2 
billion and only approximately $150 million actually finds its way into 
the hands of the fanners in the former colonies.93 
Second, the global economy of the 1990's is very different from 
the economic climate of the 1970's which fueled the first Lome Con-
84 Srr Commission Proposes to ModifY the EU's Banana Regime, DIRECTORATE GEN. 
FOR TRADE, No\,. 10, 1999. 
85 Srr COlllmunication to the Commission: Settlement of the Banana Dispute, DIREC-
TORATE GEN. FOR TRADE, Brussels (Sept. 13, 1999), availablr al http://emopa.eu.int/ 
comm/dgO/1309bana.htm. 
86 See id. 
87/d. 
88 See EU 10 Preselll New Banal/a Imporl S),slelll, REUTERS ENGLISH NEWS SERY., Reuters 
Limited 1999, No\,. 8, 1999. 
89 Sheppard, supra note 7, at 88, 89. 
90 See id. at 88; EU/US Dispute on Banana: Commission Gi\'es New Impetus to Resol\'e 
Banana Dispute, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (JuI. 5, 2000), available al http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/ trade /mi ti! dispute/banana/050700bana_ en.h tm. 
91 /d. at 89. 
92 Fain'tough & McDermott, slljJf([ note 4. 
93/d. 
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vention.94 The "new international economic order" designed to redis-
tribute wealth to benefit the developing countries is an outdated 
paradigm, and the newer EU members are less sympathetic to this 
post-colonial tie.95 
In addition, Lome IV "perpetuates ACP dependence on the EU, 
and promotes paternalism and clientism rather than a partnership."96 
The system has created ACP economies that are dependent on ba-
nana trade preferences, thereby making any attempt at re-negotiation 
very difficult.97 Furthermore, the ACP nations have failed to diversify 
their exports, relying instead upon a few principal products.98 
Finally, public opinion in the EU increasingly questions why the 
EU should provide aid to the ACP nations when, at the same time, its 
own Member States confront serious economic and social problems.99 
Furthermore, the trend in EU aid has been to help the newly emerg-
ing democracies of Eastern Europe join the EU,l°O Consequently, aid 
allocations historically reserved for ACP programs are currently being 
diverted to Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean to promote priva-
tization and democracy.IOI 
B. ACP Perspective 
The ACP nations have underlined the EU's obligations under the 
Lome Convention and its banana protocol,l°2 The countries call for 
the preservation of the present regime and resent that the WTO 
panel has made application of Lome IV so difficult.lo3 The ACP na-
tions harbor a legitimate fear that their bananas will not be able to 
compete with Latin American bananas in an open market and are, 
94 Sheppard. supra note 7, at 89. 
951d. at 89 n.57 (citing Beyond Lome!Y.· Expioling Options for Future ACP-EU Cooperation, 
EUROPEAN CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY MANAGEMENT, Chap. 3 Redrawing the Map: 
The Scope for Differentiated Approaches (1996)). 
96 lri. at 89 n.63 (citing Dipankar De SarkaI', Heicome to the Era of Delleiopment Non-
ColtjJel"(ltion, INTER PRESS SERV., at 1). 
97 ld. at 89; see Khansari, sapra note 16 at 198 n.158 (citing Frances Williams, WTO Ral-
ing Could Rain Poor Banana Econolllies, FIN.TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at 4). 
98 Sheppard, supra note 7, at 89. 
991d. at 90. 
100 lri. at 89 n.63 (citing Dipankar De SarkaI', Heicome to the Era of Droelopment Non-
CoojJeration, INTER PRESS SERV., at 1). 
101 !d. at 90. 
102 The Commission Reports to the Council on Consultations 'Nith a View to Settle-
ment of the Banana Disputes, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR TRADE, Sept. 10, 1999. 
103 lei. 
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therefore, resisting any change in the EU's system.104 Unfortunately 
for the ACP nations, however, the power to change the banana import 
regime resides with the EU.105 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EU's NEW PROPOSAL 
On September 13, 1999, the EU Directorate General for Trade 
convened, and the EU Member States expressed to the Commission a 
desire to try to reach a solution to the banana trade war,106 specifically, 
a solution "which seems to meet the needs of the ACP countries, is 
not prohibitively expensive, and complies with the WTO rules, as we 
believe they should be interpreted. "107 In response, the Directorate 
General for Trade proposed replacing the present Tariff Rate Quota 
(TRQ) system with the establishment of a tariff only system, a single 
tariff without the quota for bananas imported from outside the 
ACP.108 
On November 10, 1999, the EU announced a new tariff only sys-
tem that will eliminate the complex mix of import quotas and tariffs 
of the New Banana Regime, meet the objective of bringing the regime 
into line with the commitments of the WTO, respect the Lome IV 
Convention, and protect the interests of EU producers and consum-
ers. 109 A two-step approach was proposed. no Phase One is a transi-
tional period consisting of the current TRQ system, accompanied by a 
tariff preference for the ACP countries.lll On January 1, 2006, at the 
end of the transitional period, Phase Two would replace the tariff-
quota system with a tariff-only system.1l2 
The transitional period will maintain two existing tariff quotas 
and also will establish a new quota that would be open to all produc-
ers, while extending preferential treatment to ACP cOllntries.ll3 The 
85. 
104 Chen. slljJra note 27. at 1299. 
105 EU to Hpsenl Nrw Banana hlljJorl System. slIjna note 88. 
106 Communication to the Commission: Settlement of the Banana Dispute. SlljHa note 
107Id. 
108/d. 
109Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Communication to the Commission: Settlement of the Banana Dispute, slIjJra note 
85; EU/US Dispute on Banana: Commission Gives New Impetlls to Resolve Banana Dis-
pute. supra note 90. 
112 Commission Proposes to Modify the EU's Banana Regime, slt/Jra note 84. 
113 /d. 
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ACP preference would allow ACP bananas to enter at zero duty.114 
This is a key practical aspect of the transitional quota system and, in 
order to avoid further wro challenges, the agreement of interested 
countries will be sought.1l5 Tariffs likely will be set through an auc-
tioning system, while ACP countries would be given tariff preference 
through a lower rate.116 Ideally, this interim plan will give ACP coun-
tries time to adjust to the new import system and to adapt appropri-
ately to a new market dynamic.117 
The tariff only system will enter into force automatically on Janu-
ary 1, 2006.118 At that time, the level of the flat tariff would have to be 
negotiated under Article XXVII of GATT.1l9 However, the plan will 
give ACP nations an appropriate tariff preference, which would be 
possible with the re-negotiation and renewal of Lome IV under the 
waiver. 120 
The Commission's proposal must be approved by EU Member 
States, which have been sharply divided between those who favor the 
current system and those who want lower banana prices for their con-
sumers.l2l Thus far, the new proposal has not alleviated or defused the 
EU/US trade tensions.122 The Commission submitted its plan to the 
foreign ministers of the Member States for consideration on Novem-
ber 15, 1999 and, as of July 2000, minimal progress had occurred.123 
The only headway made is that it appears that allocating import li-
censes during the proposed transitional tariff-quota system is best 
managed on a "first come, first served" basis.124 
Central American banana producers rejected the EU's proposal 
because the it continues to favor unfairly the ACP nations.125 In addi-
tion, the Central American producers are concerned about how im-
1I4Id. 
1I51d. 
116 Newmann, supra note 8. 
117 ld. 
118 Commission Proposes to ModifY the EU's Banana Regime, supra note 84. 
1I9Id. 
120 /d. 
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port licenses would be distributed in the six years before the perma-
nent system is implemented.126 
Furthermore, the US also rebuffed the EU's proposal, claiming 
that more changes are needed to end its economic sanctions and that 
it was displeased that the EU rejected the suggestions of the US.I 27 
The US encountered difficulty in presenting a united front in its ef-
fort to lobby the EU since the two companies involved in the dispute, 
Chiquita and Dole, have changed their views on their preferred solu-
tion.128 
The EU Commission's proposal of a tariff only system is the best 
solution offered thus far for the EU to satisfY all of its commitments. l29 
However, in order for the proposal to work, the EU must re-negotiate 
Lome IV and it must obtain the approval of the vVTO, the Latin 
American countries, and the US.130 These are realistic barriers to a 
resolution of the banana trade war because it is unlikely that all par-
ties will agree.131 Mter almost a year of intensive negotiations, the EU 
is at an impasse with the ACP nations as to a suitable re-definition of 
their relationship.I32 However, if the WTO decides that the proposed 
new system complies with global trade laws, the US and Latin Ameri-
can countries must accept the result and the US must lift its sanc-
tions.133 At that point, the EU only needs to worry about placating the 
ACP nations.134 Therefore, the most substantial hurdle is passing the 
WTO standards; the other parties involved will have less strength in 
their positions once the EU secures WTO approvaI.I35 Unfortunately, 
the ACP preferences that still exist, especially in the u'ansitional pe-
riod of the new proposal, might be significant enough to continue to 
violate the MFN clause and send the ED back to square one.I36 
126 Id. 
127 US Rejects EU Plan to End Banana Trade DisjJllte. REUTERS INT'L NEWS SERV., No\,. 10. 
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CONCLUSION 
Both EU and the US wanted to reach a solution to the banana 
trade war before the launch of the new global trade round in the 
wro meeting in Seattle in early December.137 This solution did not 
occur. Although the EU's various commitments are important and 
difficult to reconcile, the EU has made a genuine effort to appease all 
parties and, as a result, it should be rewarded with the acceptance of 
its new proposal and the lifting of US sanctions. 
137 EU to Present New Banana Import Systelll, 'supm note 88. 
